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A Comparative Empirical Study of Negotiation in
Criminal Proceedings Between Brazil and the United
States of America
Ricardo Gueiros Bernardes Dias1
ABSTRACT: The present research aims to understand the law in regards to the types of negotiations performed under the law of criminal procedure and to understand how the discursive practice of lawyers can organize social practices from a comparative empirical
perspective of Brazil and the United States of America. Thus, the research comparatively investigates the institutional processes for the
establishment of truth before the bodies of the judicial branch in Brazil (metropolitan region of Vitória, ES-Brazil) and in the U.S. (California, San Francisco) and focuses on their differences in their criminal negotiation in the special criminal courts and the institution of
plea bargaining, which is widely used in the U.S. judicial system.
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empirical
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars appear to be increasingly convinced that they must interpret any law, court order, or legal doctrine by considering the position of the executive and legislative branches, the context of the judicial culture, and the actions of the juridical agents that permeate the
field of law. The interests of society diversely affect different fields
of law. Therefore, the concern addressed in the present study is to
understand the law from a comparative empirical perspective, primarily in Brazil and the United States, and to understand how the discursive practice of lawyers might organize social practices, particularly
in regards to the forms of negotiation used in criminal justice in the
context of individual rights at the same time.
The distinction between theory and practice is the cornerstone of
legal interpretation. The ideas behind theory and practice lead toward
two different roads at different speeds. It has been said that it is
commonplace to talk about human rights; however, little has been
achieved in terms of the effectiveness of turning aspirations into factual rights.2 The prevalent methodology is qualitative, consisting of
fieldwork, participant observations, and comparisons between the
systems in question. This observation was made in person in the
courts of first instance, both in Brazil and the United States, and
achieved effective participation of those who will receive the adjudication simply by being there.
Participant observations, open interviews, and other methods of
fieldwork were performed in direct and unabated contact for a considerable period of time with the involved actors. The dialogue justifies why it is necessary to incorporate the reasons of the actors within
the environment in which the researcher starts to act. Fieldwork involves an inter-subjective relation in which there is no neutrality, but
rather an interest to incorporate the environment. It is essential to
know what the interlocutors think. Consequently, it is necessary to
contextualize the collected data within an academic culture. In fact,
good science requires fieldwork, as information is extracted from the
actors that participate in the process.3
2.
3.

NORBERTO BOBBIO, A ERA DOS DIREITOS, 67 (1992).
ROBERTO KANT DE LIMA, A ANTROPOLOGIA DA ACADEMIA: QUANDO OS INDIOS SOMOS
NOS 16 (1997).
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There is no intention to assert that traditional rituals never work;
the ancient custom of praying in Latin, which is performed by the
priest, reaches its goal of maintaining the ignorance of the faithful.
However, the claim made here is part of the communication inclusion.
FIELDWORK ON PLEA BARGAINING IN THE U.S.
If it were possible to choose a basic premise to contextualize the
criminal justice system in the United States, it would be the following: “controlling the coexistence with impurity and crime, and not
purifying it or banishing it.”4
According to the same author, this would be the same as affirming that crime in the United States has a relationship with sin. In other
words, crime is a voluntary choice of the perpetrator.5 There is a clear
division between those who obey these consensual rules and those
who deliberately and explicitly defy these rules.6 In addition, this has
an immediate and direct relationship with the form of production of
truth in the adversarial model, which is based on a constant search for
consensus.7 Unlike Brazil, the United States judicial system’s search
for consensus is essential for the recognition of self-knowledge.8
In Brazil, there is no intention to reach a consensus—i.e., to establish such facts—nor to agree upon the evidence to be brought to
trial.9 The process calls for consensus, but often fails due to the nature of the facts, which often contradict each other. After hearing the
opposing arguments, the judge makes a ruling on a particular conviction, a decision which is often contaminated by several variables, according to empirical research.10

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

ROBERTO KANT DE LIMA, ENSAIOS DE ANTROPOLOGIA E DE DIREITO: ACESSO À JUSTIÇA
E PROCESSOS INSTITUCIONAIS DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS E PRODUÇÃO DA
VERDADE JURÍDICA EM UMA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ROBERTO KANT DE LIMA, SENSIBILIDADES JURÍDICAS, DEFINIÇÕES DE JUSTIÇA E
PROCESSO PENAL (2012).
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a. The First Contact
“This is the best thing that I can do for him.” This was one of the
first phrases I heard at an informal hearing of plea bargaining that
took place in the chamber11 of the Hall of Justice in San Francisco.
The following individuals were present: the District Attorney, the defendant’s lawyer, and the judge. The words of the District Attorney
were addressed—in front of the judge—to the lawyer of the defendant. These words were related to a proposal that had just been presented to allow the defendant to avoid a trial. In other words, the acceptance of the offer by the defendant would represent the end of the
dispute and, as a consequence, the resolution of the conflict. The sentence would then be imposed not from a procedure that targets the
search for the “truth” of the facts but from an agreement with the
purpose, among others, to avoid trial. The lawyer—waiting for the
judge’s reaction (who remained inert) —decided to accept the proposal.
The scene above describes not only what is observed in everyday
life in American criminal courts, but also is much more than that: it
is, in fact, the core of the “ritual” of almost all defendants accused of
having committed a crime. The cinematic image of the American
judgments performed in the presence of the jury only occurs in a
small number of cases, as will be observed. On average, almost 96%
of the criminal cases before U.S. courts are resolved through a negotiation called plea bargaining.12
As one who comes from a civil culture, it was initially a natural
curiosity to discover the juridical rules that regulate plea bargaining.
After all, if almost all of the cases are assessed according to this rule,
it would be expected that a detailed formal procedure of the entire legal ritual in use is available.
The first attempt was to use the index of the California Penal
Code,13 which resulted in the identification of the first obstacle. The
initial impressions from the common law dated back to an idea of a
11.
12.

13.

Chamber is the term assigned to the office used by the judges within the court.
John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 113 (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers 2014),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=clsops_p
apers.
CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West).
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small number of written rules and a wide use of legal precedents.14 In
other words, there was a notion that customary law had its roots in
solving its disputes in the tradition of previous trials. This is what is
generally taught in the law courses in Brazil. Note that there was a
complete lack of formal legal rules, but their existence was imagined
to be limited to the formulation of general rules and the characterization of a reasonable number of crimes. The very principled, generic
conception of the U.S. Constitution provided this first notion.
There was, however, a Code15 of over 34,370 sections in California, notwithstanding the existing extravagant criminal legislation.16 In
contrast, the combined number of articles of the Brazilian penal code
and criminal procedure code is 1,172 (361 articles of the penal code
and 811 of the criminal procedure code).17 In addition, the subdivisions of the sections of the California Penal Code can be extremely
long, as they are sometimes written in an informal language with a
highly explicative intention. For example, California Penal Code §
830 with its subdivisions fills twenty-three pages of the Code.18 We
must remember in advance that there is no separate or distinct criminal procedure code in the state of California. All procedural rules are
embedded in the actual California Penal Code. In fact, contrary to
what we have in Brazil, there is no academic concern associated with
conducting a detailed study on the nature of the procedure as a mere
instrument for conflict resolution or as a true autonomous figure. In14.
15.

16.
17.
18.

The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, U.C. (March 8, 2016),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html.
CAL. CODE. REGS. (2016). In fact, this is more a compilation of rules than a code (as it
is known in Brazil). In the U.S., the Member State may legislate on criminal matters.
In fact, there is no penal code with national coverage. There is – in truth – the Model
Penal Code, which is a document written mostly by scholars as an attempt to homogenize the state penal law. Therefore, it is not a law in the strict sense due to its nonobligatory aspect. Nevertheless, the adherence to this text is widely applied in approximately two-thirds of the American states. However, these rules are commonly used at
the federal level and do not make any reference to plea bargaining. It is important to
highlight the existence of the “Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”, which are rules
issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and sent to Congress for “approval.” Rule 11 expressly provides the figure of plea agreement, which is essentially the same institution
that is known as plea bargaining. However, these norms are also limited to the sphere
of federal crimes. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West).
BRAZIL.C.C.; BRAZIL C.P.P.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 830-830.15 (West 2016).
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cidentally, when pursuing the criminal procedure discipline in the literature used in the universities, the primary focus is on the constitutional principles of criminal procedure.
First I searched for a systematic index in which the formulation
of the discipline of plea bargaining rules could be found. There was
no exclusive section for plea bargaining in the index. I then performed a quick reading of the 639 sections associated with the rules
of criminal procedure of the state of California. This search was also
in vain. Despite some scarce retrievals of the term “plead guilty”
throughout the code, there were no plea bargaining regulations.
Moreover, there was not even the impression that it would be possible to use this procedure. A simple reading of the code led to the belief that the trial, either by a jury or by the judge himself (in the form
of a bench trial), was the most common destination of the cases to be
examined by the judiciary branch.
Before investigating the legal literature that would be the pillar
of the legal institution of plea bargaining, I decided to search for answers from actual practitioners of law. In other words, I decided to
research the common notion among those who used it more. When I
posed this inquiry to a former public defender, he replied, “I believe
there is no special section of the disciplinary code for this theme. It is
more of a procedure established by decisions.”19 In this answer, we
can see an uncertainty related to the non-existence of formal laws on
the subject. This uncertainty in itself already indicated something:
even if there was a regulation, it would not be the main parameter of
the operators of law. If this is not the case, the public defender would
at least declare its existence, even if he did not know its contents).
When Judge “J” from the Hall of Justice was asked this intriguing question, he replied evasively without facing the problem directly:
This is an interesting question. I believe there are some
sections of the code that do not “advise” plea bargaining in
some situations. Well, I do not know ... I have been a judge
for only 3 years. Before this period, I was a public defender
for nearly 30 years. Throughout this period of 30 years, I
participated in several plea bargaining hearings in San Fran19.

Interview with former Pub. Def., in Cal.
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cisco and in many other Counties. And each site uses a different type of procedure. Only in counties with higher crime
rates you will find plea bargaining as you find it in San
Francisco. In counties where there is no high index of
crimes of greater offensive potential, you do not even notice
the participation of the judge in the negotiations. The District Attorney will make an offer and it is done! And it has
an explanation in my view. A greater number of crimes obviously results in a greater number of cases.20
It is perhaps for this reason that this theme captured so much of
my attention. Upon arriving in the U.S., there was no precise delimitation of the subject to be investigated. There was a desire to investigate the models of the production of truth in the American process. In
addition, at first sight there was no production of truth to be actually
“found” but rather negotiated in a system of dispute settlement that
has a huge legal standardization. This however is apparently used only for cases that are brought to trial. In other words, the solution to
almost all of the disputes brought to court is based on a procedure
performed backstage of the courtroom and that has as its premise a
procedure that is not formally legislated.
The California Penal Code was primarily mentioned by the actors of the process as will be shown later to verify a possible legal
classification of the criminal conducts.21 Thus, the widespread use of
this ritual, which dictates almost all prosecutions, and the ritual that
follows the recent tradition were the main reasons for the thematic
delimitation. In fact, plea bargaining has become the “talk of the
town.” It is rare to find someone even outside of the legal field that is
unfamiliar and does not have his own opinion on the subject. This is
not a procedural technicality. In Brazil, these discussions are limited
to the defendants, and in most cases to their representatives.
b. The Judge’s Participation In The Bargaining
Even though there is no legal provision under state law or in Title 18 of the U.S. Code the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(rules issued by the Supreme Court and approved by the Congress)
20.
21.

Interview with Judge “J”, Cal. Hall of Justice.
Id.
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they do however define plea agreement, which is, in essence, the
same as plea bargaining.22 Despite being also limited to the sphere of
federal crimes, such rules serve only as a legal basis or doctrinal
foundation. In fact, there is a manifest rule to prohibit the participation of the judge in the negotiation. “The court must not participate in
these discussions.”23 However, in practice, the participation of the
judge is unambiguous with respect to the cases resolved at the state
level.
From this informal negotiation, only two situations may occur:
1) There is consensus on the proposal: In this case, the
defender consults the defendant (who is usually under arrest
in the same building and waiting in a nearby room) or, if
free on bond, out in the hallway or a conference room to determine whether he agrees to the presented conditions. If the
defendant agrees, then the formal right (in a hearing to be
held afterwards) of pleading guilty will take place.
2) There is no consensus on the proposal: Strictly, dissent marks the beginning of the instruction of the legal process for further judgment. However, plea bargaining is the
ultimate destination for almost all of the cases that are
brought before the court. A lack of agreement is usually only in practice a postponement for a supervening negotiation.
Plea bargaining can recur at any time, even during the jury
trial.
In the early stage of my fieldwork, the judge received me with
great kindness and said “if plea bargaining is what you are looking
for, this is the right place.”24 While we were sitting in his chambers,
the judge pulled a chair and placed it next to him. After a few
minutes, he initiated the possibility of negotiations, which were presented by the prosecutor. First, he introduced me to all of the assistant
district attorneys and defenders present, highlighting my position as
observer. After the completion of the backstage negotiations and a
22.
23.
24.

See, FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 11.
FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 11.
Interview with Judge “J”, Cal. Hall of Justice.
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brief pause granted by the judge, all of the participants headed to the
courtroom. Strictly, all of the defenders had already consulted their
clients regarding the proposals prior.
The courtroom proceedings were nothing more than the formal
approval of the negotiation; in some cases there was an agreement,
but for the others, there was a postponement.25 The judge called the
defendants (one by one) to warn and inquire as to whether the defendant was aware of the consequences of the declaration of guilt.
The judge pronounced the sentence before the formal acceptance.
c. Common Sense and the Plea Bargain
The nationally known journalist, Morley Safer, who leads the
television program 60 Minutes interviewed the Attorney General of
Rhode Island, Arlene Violet.26 Promptly, the interviewer introduced
his idea about the system, which, according to him, would be common sense: “One of the blots on the legal landscape in the USA is
plea bargaining.”27
At this moment, he simulated in a monologue a conversation between a District Attorney and a defender:
I know that my client spanked his partner, who was 50
years old, during the last 6 weeks. However, if my client
chooses to declare that he is not guilty and to take the case
to trial, we will have at least 6 weeks of your time (in addition of your entire team). However, if he declares guilty, he
will obtain a lighter indictment. Let us reach an agreement.
Give him three months [in prison]. [...] Is this not what happens in most cases?28
In turn, Arlene Violet rebated without hesitation:

25.

26.

27.
28.

The (re)scheduling of the hearings drew attention due to its transparency and informality. Everything was done by consensus (the consent of all participants was indispensable).
See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA 129 (1993) (Interview by Morley Safer with Arlene Violet, Attorney General of Rhode Island).
Id.
Id.
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No! Plea bargaining is just a blot that ignores the quality
of justice: there is no balance between plea bargaining and
what actually happened in the case. If you bring me a case
and if you are honest, you will sit down and say, ‘Arlene,
here is the proof that I have for my case, and here are my
weaknesses. And the role of the data is such and such.’ I
will look deep in your eyes and say, ‘I disagree with you on
this, this, and this. We have this body of evidence.’ Thus,
we will try to obtain what justice does in these cases. That is
what plea bargaining does.29
The dialogue in the interview portrays the tension between the
opinions from “those of the outside” and “those of the inside.”30 From
the external perception, something is notorious: negotiation, in practice, sacrifices quality for quantity, i.e., for justice to demonstrate, in
absolute numbers, its efficiency. In contrast, the ones involved in the
process see plea bargaining as a legal and ethical process that is wellstructured according to the known methods that will lead to negotiation.31
It is worth mentioning that the biggest problem, in the words of
the Attorney General, is “ignoring the fact that negotiations are rarely
performed by clearing things up.”32 In fact, the opposite normally occurs. In this study, the connection between plea bargaining and the
trial itself remains clear. In the beginning, some of the strategies that
would be eventually released in the trial are anticipated. This interlacing shows my assertion. To clear up a matter during the negotiation
phase would anticipate what you have on hand for a future judgment,
which would be suicide for any party. Thus, the opposite is observed.
In the field, what we often see is a game of “bluffs” because one attempts to show strength and thus hides some cards up one’s sleeve.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
MCCOY, supra note 26, at 129-30.
Id.
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d. Plea Bargaining and Juridical-Religious Culture in the
U.S.
The admission of guilt from an accused person has been around
since ancient times. What seems to be something more recent, at least
in the context of law in the U.S., is the wide use of the declaration of
guilt by the accused to avoid a trial, which allows immediate punishment. Although it has existed since the Middle Ages in England (and,
consequently, in the American colonial period),33 its wide use appears
to be precocious.
The idea of confession, regret, and forgiveness appears to always
be linked to local religious rituals.34 Consequently, it would be difficult to say that the religious traces in a given society would be separated from the way the society addresses the adjustment of local
law.35 In the U.S., which is a nation with a very striking Protestant
tradition, it is not difficult to notice the intermingling between these
issues. Vincent Crapanzano performed interesting fieldwork in his
investigation of the connection between the courtroom and the pulpit
ritual,36 more specifically the relationship between the bench and the
pulpit. Crapanzano, as the very title of his study suggests, focuses on
the attachment to the word literalism and denotes the transparency in
the two forms of ritual, i.e. legal and religious.37 Moreover, this
transparency38 gives legitimacy to the process.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.

See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 43
(1979).
See VINCENT CRAPANZANO, SERVING THE WORD: LITERALISM IN AMERICA FROM THE
PULPIT TO THE BENCH (2000).
Id.
It is interesting to note the differentiation in the treatment given by the ethnographer to
both environments: “The reader must have noticed the discrepancy between my chapters on Fundamentalism and those on Law. I treat Fundamentalists in a more gentle
way compared to lawyers and judges, with whom I am engaged in a more heated argument. [. ] I find that Fundamentalists have, for their salvation, sacrificed and condemned aspects of social and cultural life from which I gain a sense of meaning, satisfaction, and pleasure. [. ]. I liked many of the Fundamentalists I came to know. I did
not really become friends with any of them—I couldn’t.” Id. at 324, 328.
Id.
Id. at 238. “Transparency” must not be confused with the public character of the process, as occurs in Brazil. The important thing is to know how the negotiation is publicized. The publication in the Official Gazette (Diário Oficial) does not grant transparency to the legal practices. The document is public, but there is no transparency.
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This link is found, for example, in the most important symbols of
both rituals: the Constitution and the Bible.39 Many Americans construct a relationship between the Constitution and the Bible as divine
providence.40 The American president Abraham Lincoln used to ask
the Americans to embrace the principle of “reverence to the laws” as
the “political religion of the nation.”41 A judge of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the 1920’s faithfully believed that the Constitution, as well as the Sacred Scripture, was a “legal instrument that
was divinely inspired.”42 There are those who believe that there is a
representation of the Bible’s holy trinity in the symbols of the American nation: 1) the Constitution, 2) the Declaration of Independence,
and 3) the Flag of the U.S.43 According to Professor Vincent
Crapanzano, the symbolism of these issues is clear:
Moreover, American political and social understanding is
continually articulated in and through religious, primarily
Christian, symbols. That these symbols should be taken at
face value, as indicative of heartfelt belief rather than rhetorically, as potentially moving conventions of oratory, is itself symptomatic of the literalism I am trying to delineate in
this book.44
The civil religion has become an emblem of the social identity of
the American people, which is rooted in the social ideology.45
Moreover, at the heart of this religious reality, the delineating
principles of the declaration of guilt of the accused are inserted. Unlike Catholicism, in which the confession is secretive and performed
before the religious leader (the representative of God), pleading
guilty one sees a need of making the regret public, through the representation of the testimony, before the society, that the criminal act to
which one is charged is worthy of a punitive response.46 Neverthe39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

CRAPANZANO, supra note 34, at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CRAPANZANO, supra note 34, at 230-31.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 70.
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less, precisely because of this regret, the punishment is mitigated with
another typical symbolism of religious tradition—forgiveness.47
This is a nodal point of this system. It is as if there was a prestipulated condition for the negotiation. Similar to how there is a need
of regret (which, in itself, is already a penitence) for the effectiveness
of prayer to reach God, in the legal ambit there exists the need for the
declaration of guilt to possess the postulating ability for bargaining,
i.e., of remission of punishment (whether partial or total remission).48
One of the differences with respect to this point is that the confession—at the juridical level—is independent of the moral value of
honesty and sincerity because it is the society itself that does not appear to give “sacred” relevance to such values.49
Contrary to what occurs in the United States, the maintenance of
order in Brazil comes from the concealment of the conflict.50 In
American law, the negotiation, as observed in the institute of plea
bargaining, is made public (regarding the forms of guilt and truth).51
Hence, it is necessary to make the comparison through confrontation
and not similarity because mixing a system of consensus with a system of dissent is the heart of the problem, whether it is accusatory
(where charges are public) or inquisitorial (where charges are written
and secretive).52
e. The Non-Existence of a Legal Basis for Plea Bargaining
It would be difficult to understand plea bargaining without understanding a little-studied phenomenon (even in the legal literature
in the U.S.): the figure of the prosecutor. As we will find, its genesis
does not have any similarity with what the Brazilian legal culture un47.
48.
49.

50.
51.

52.

Id. at 73.
Id.
Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AMER. L. ECON.
REV. 227 (2002),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell/pdf/4_Amer_Law_Econ_Rev_227.pdf.
Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the
United States, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1601, 1618 (Oct. 1996).
How Courts Work, ABA (2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/
law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/pleabargaining.html.
Civil Law vs. Criminal Law, DIFFEN (2015),
http://www.diffen.com/difference/Civil_Law_vs_Criminal_LAW.
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derstands as public ministry. In a controversial, but well accepted,
study, Allen Steinberg53 intended to demonstrate that the image of a
public prosecutor, which is a representative of the people, has been
around since 1920.54 He stressed that the majority of Americans,
when thinking about the operation of the prosecution (District Attorney), already have in mind a public figure that represents an independent power and has a high power of discretion, which leads many
authors to state that prosecutors have more power than the judges
themselves.55
In contrast, he stated that this public representative has mysterious origins with very few notes prior to the year 1880. In a previous
period, the figure of the private prosecutor prevailed because a citizen
always initiated criminal causes.56 During the greater part of the nineteenth century, the criminal system had, as a root, a relationship of
voluntarism among the citizen (pursuer) and the judiciary.57 In addition, this volunteerism means nothing more than the discretion involved due to the private nature of this relationship.58
Therefore, on the question of private prosecution, the important
thing is to realize through the study that this discretion is “transferred” to the current figure of the District Attorney.59 Proof of this
transference is that the District Attorney is elected.60 In Brazil, due to
the principle of obligation, this discretion does not exist. Even in
those cases in which the principle of obligation does not exist anymore, this does not occur in the same manner. Moreover, it is precisely because they are elected that these individuals should be held ac53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.

Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution,
the District Attorney, and American Legal History, CRIME & DELINQUENCY 568, 592
(1984).
Howard S. Gans, The Public Prosecutor: His Powers, Temptations, and Limitations,
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 120, 132 (May 1973).
Steinberg, supra note 53.
John Lea, Courts and Prosecution In Nineteenth Century (2003),
http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/history/36807.htm.
Unraveling the Concept of Volunteer Policing, UNIV. PITTSBURGH PRESS 1, 5 (2005).
Id. at 12.
Are There Limits to Prosecutorial Discretion, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Jan. 1, 2003),
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countable for their actions; the understanding of the institution of accountability is paramount to the understanding of the main differences between the two systems.
In this sense, Vera Ribeiro de Almeida authoritatively observes
the following:
Even if one defends that the negotiation was imported
from this model, as among us there is no mechanism of accountability, our prosecutors keep acting in accordance with
the authority that each one judges having, without such
choices being permitted by law or any concern about the future responsibility of such choices.61
In Brazil, the state is the one who holds justice in its hands. The
King is the Emperor. These differences in origin demonstrate how
these systems are anchored in different places. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the identification of plea bargaining is linked to this
feature of discretion, which does not occur in Brazil.
Even though the declaration of guilt had already appeared in the
American colonial period, its effects were very diverse. The literature
suggests that these declarations were relatively rare and treated with
suspicion. The declaration of guilt, notably with felony crimes that
deserved more severe punishment, often led to the execution of the
accused; as a result judges themselves were suspicious that the accused acted as a result of coercion or of misinformation. For this reason, the judges prompted the defendants to exercise their rights associated with trial proceedings.
The concept of plea bargaining—the negotiation between the
prosecution and the defenders with the purpose of promoting the declaration of guilt aimed at bargaining—was an unknown practice in
the U.S. until the nineteenth century.62 Before this period, cases tried
by jury were generally decided more quickly, without significant regard for formal evidence examination and procedure.63 It was common for lawyers to represent both parties in the same dispute. More61.
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Vera Ribeiro de Almeida, Transação Penal e Penas Alternativas: Uma Pesquisa
Empírica nos Juizados Especiais Criminais no Rio de Janeiro (2012) (unpublished
dissertation, Universidade Gama Filho) (on file with author).
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over, no catalysts existed to promote the development of a plea bargaining system before the nineteenth century.64 The change in these
characteristics led to the first movements in favor of such an institution. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the U.S. was faced
with a sudden change from a system of trials to a plea bargaining system, which was already the most widely used method of conflict
resolution.65
In this analysis, we return to the initial idea of plea bargaining
regulation. This transformation was neither the result of an introduction of, or changes in, the legislation, nor the result of a formal creation of rules by the judiciary itself—something usually observed in
the U.S., notably by the Supreme Court.66 According to legal scholars, the adoption of this transformation originated in large part from
the response of the prosecutor to the excess of cases submitted to the
judicial branch.67
The increase in its use occurred especially because of the usual
(and expected) causes present in the modification of the rituals of the
judiciary in various parts of the world. In other words, the increases
in both the population and the crime rates spurred the increase.68 In
addition, the increase in the complexity of trials by jury and the professionalization of criminal justice favored the rise in the use of plea
bargaining. Plea bargaining became the D.A.’s first attempt at a solution to legal disputes, because the D.A. did not have enough time and
resources to monitor every case that went to trial.69
It is remarkable that, through field research, I was able to observe that plea bargaining is a necessity for many practitioners as a
condition on the sound functioning of justice. As soon as I approached one of the operators, and showed my interest in performing
a comparative research study about the system, the burning question
on their minds was, “How does plea bargaining work in Brazil?”
My reply was ready and immediate: “We have not, in Brazilian
criminal proceedings, an institution that has a similarity plausible to
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 572.
Steinberg, supra note 53, at 585.
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the point to finding similar categories; we have, only, figures with
links that may bring about a confronting research.” Later in the conversation, I only made a brief reference to our penal negotiation—
even though the two systems share more differences than similarities.
However, the following inquiry—loaded with an obvious strangeness/irony—arises: “However, how do you, then, judge all the cases?”
In principle, this question brings forth a twofold analysis: (1)
who are the subjects that reveal this inquiry/strangeness; and (2) what
this question informs us in the foreground. With regards to the first
analysis I can state that to my surprise, I noticed this inquiry in all
sectors of society, including outside the milieu of legal practitioners.
This question was the main area of interest for the vast majority of
judges, defenders, engineers, and civil servants. This first point of
analysis lends itself to the second point of examination. The question,
and therefore the perception, of plea bargaining is not limited to actors in the legal system. Generally, it is common knowledge that the
existence of plea bargaining arose from pragmatic concerns. In principle, it is not better or worse, but rather the solution that was found,
either if it is palliative or already definitive in U.S. society. It was as
if my American interlocutor wanted to ask me, “How does your model work without the existence of plea bargaining?” Some of the interviewed individuals even came to their own immediate conclusions: “I
suppose that the number of judges in Brazil is large.”
Of course, the absence of an immediate solution to cope with this
method is not the only reason for the “success” of this powerful procedure for penal prosecution. Several other reasons corroborate this
situation, which incidentally, was one of the main objects of study in
my research. Without prejudice to the subsequent detailed analysis, I
have recently heard of an academic who appeared at the university in
which I was doing my research, who stated a phrase that introduced
another characteristic of great relevance in the U.S., and is also one
of the fundamental aspects of plea bargaining: the adversarial system.
The idea of a solution to the dispute as part of a game between
opposite opponents, which have a thirst for victory, lead the abovementioned scholar to allude to the words of a famous football coach
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speaking on victory: “Winning is not everything; it is the only
thing.”70
Victory, game, opponent, and defeat are expressions that denote
not only a relationship—as could be seen at first—with the solution
to the disputes found in trials, but also to the negotiation of plea bargaining. The bargain is also negotiated in a behind the scenes arena,
which is typical of the adversarial system. For this reason, I asked
Judge “J” what he would alter in the institution of plea bargaining.
Showing surprise, he replied:
Well, I had never thought about it ... Well, I believe that
the reason for the existence of plea bargaining - and I think
that you have already realized this - is that, with 15,000 arrests (for felonies) per year in San Francisco, we would only
be able to judge [referring to trial] approximately 700 per
year. That is, we must eliminate these cases in some way. If
this did not happen ... well, you must be aware through the
newspapers of the budget cuts to our court. Well, even in
our best [financial] season, it would be impossible for us to
take the majority of the cases to trial. It is necessary to have
plea bargaining... or there would not be a criminal system ...
particularly in San Francisco. Theoretically speaking, the
aim of the institution is to punish the accused. The other
purpose is to ‘clean the agenda’ to allow the trial of those
cases that are really necessary. Thus, bearing in mind that
the purpose is to reduce the number of cases, if I could
change the law, I would amend it to enable plea bargaining
during trials. But, as I have already said, this only happens
in San Francisco. Another change that I would make is the
following: I believe that, in the negotiations that occur before the preliminary hearing (only between the parties), only
two or three experienced District Attorneys should be chosen for all cases. They should not be very strict and conservative Attorneys.71
70.

71.

Beau Dure, Winning Isn’t Everything; It’s the Only Thing. Right?, GUARDIAN (Sep. 24,
2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/sep/24/winning-everythingsports.
Interview with Judge “J”, Cal. Hall of Justice (May 25, 2012).
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f. Pleading Guilty and the Path to the Bargain Discretion
It is important to notice, in advance, that the approval of plea
bargaining by the Supreme Court of the United States did not introduce any innovation in relation to plead guilty in itself, i.e., with regards to the statement of guilt.72 It always existed and had (and still
has) its various functions within the American judicial model.73 The
innovative and formal approval by the Supreme Court stressed that
the American Constitution does not impose an obstacle to plea bargaining.74 In other words, what took place was the formal cementing
of one more facet of pleading guilty. It would also be the “bargaining
chip” for plea bargaining. The accused must declare himself/herself
guilty as a sine qua non condition to have the opportunity to bargain.
The bargain is not only limited to the intention of reducing the penalty to be imposed, as might appear through a first analysis. It goes
well beyond this. From the moment in which the accused declares
himself/herself guilty, the negotiating parties (here, as will be observed hereafter, we can include the judge) establish the highest degree of discretion.75
I also asked Judge “J” about this discretion, especially its limits,
and obtained the following answer:
Yes, the District Attorney has full discretion with regards
to the accusation. In addition, once indictment is formulated, it can be modified at any time. In fact, I remember that,
at the time when I was a defender, I participated in an interesting case in which the defendant was accused of murder
and I lead a negotiation for modifying the indictment to disturbing the peace, which is a low-relevance crime. And I
think that this happened for a reason. Often the police do not
have conviction that the accused actually committed the
crime. When the District Attorney realizes that he will not
72.
73.
74.
75.

Jenia I. Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54
AM. J. COMP. L. 501, 567 (2006).
See id.
Id.
I avoid using the Portuguese term “discricionariedade” and prefer the term discretion
to more accurately denote the broad contrast that we found in this area if we compare
the Brazilian system with that of the USA.
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obtain conviction of the criminal practice even by frightening the defendant, he needs to give some type of answer.
Thus, he eventually chooses the crime which, in my view,
would be the “minor” existing offense [disturbing the
peace].76
However, when I asked about the mythicizing of the judge’s
neutrality in this process, he said:
The judge fully has the final word. Well, there are different philosophies among judges, but clearly, if the judge does
not like the offer, he can just not accept it. For example, the
judge who preceded me often left aside the negotiations that
would occur previously. In all these years, I have only done
this once. I have another philosophy. If the District Attorney
and the public defender arrived at an agreement [...] They
are well aware of the case. The defender knows well what is
best for the accused, and the District Attorney is aware of
what would be the best option for society.77
Moreover, we can see one of the most striking characteristics of
plea bargaining in this statement. In one of my first visits to the
judge’s chamber (where the prior negotiation occurred, in the manner
described at the beginning of this work), I realized that, when the
prosecutor, the lawyer, and the judge start the negotiation (assuming
that there was a possibility of a declaration of guilt), there was a large
opening regarding the “destination” of the accused. I realized that it
was very common to “choose” the legal classification of the committed crime. In other words, even if they were all certain that there was
a crime of drug trafficking, it would be possible to stipulate that the
defendant would be charged with the crime of possession of drugs
and, therefore, receive a punishment that was compatible and proportional with the stipulated practice (and not performed!). The prosecution, therefore, will be formulated by a symbolic fact, which is “created” by means of a negotiation. Indeed, a German judge said the
following in an interview: “[P]lea bargaining can weaken the duty of
76.
77.

Interview with Judge “J”, Cal. Hall of Justice (May 25, 2012).
Interview with Judge “J”, Cal. Hall of Justice (May 25, 2012).
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the judge to investigate the ‘truth of the facts’ [...] the judge has a
smaller chance of checking the basis of the [facts].”78
On the negotiating table, the penal code does not serve as a parameter for the suitability of the practiced conduct but as a range of
options that serves as a helm for the choice (pick up) of the punishment to be applied.
Conversely, in Brazil, the first steps in the theory of criminal law
already show us that one of the basic principles of the law (it is not
just about the criminal sphere) is the legality.79 Both the Constitution
and the penal code stipulate that there will be no crime if the law does
not previously set the conduct that is eventually practiced; in addition, there will be no punishment without prior legal application.80
This is a principle under which various decisions are made.
I was once struck with an interesting comparison: the idea of
plea bargaining is the same as that of “grade bargaining,” i.e., a negotiation between a teacher and a student. Let us suppose that a school
assignment has been submitted to the teacher and, after a brief look at
the first page, the teacher tells the student that, if he would carefully
read the entire work and apply his usual strict rules, he would most
likely decide to grant it a “D” grade. However, if the student relinquished his right to have his work meticulously examined and consciously criticized, the professor would agree to grant it a “B” grade.
Considering that the student gives precedence for the general average
of grades—and less precedence to learning and the justice of the
grade—the satisfied student accepts the “B” grade, and the teacher is
satisfied with the reduction in their workload.81
Although the illustration is interesting, it does not correspond
faithfully to what occurs in plea bargaining, particularly in relation to
one of its premises. First, in the illustration, the professor would have
a dual role, which is to say, prosecutor and judge. Second, in the example given, the teacher already predetermines that a well-

78.
79.

80.
81.

Turner, supra note 72, at 225.
Andrey B. de Mendonca, The Criminal Justice System in Brazil: A Brief Account,
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established analysis (i.e., a trial) would imply a lower grade (i.e., a
high/rigorous penalty). This predetermination (at least in the manner
of this illustration), however, does not exist in plea bargaining, especially if we bear in mind that, although the punishment is stipulated
by the judge, it will be the task of the jury (which is not included in
the negotiation) to “tell the ‘truth’ of the facts.”82
In the academic seats of university degree courses in Law, we
have already learned the old adage (formalized in the Constitution)
according to which the citizen might do (or fail to do) everything that
the law does not prohibit, whereas the public man can only achieve
what is expressly defined by the rule of law. In the U.S., we observe
something quite different. The idea of discretion by the police officer
is commonplace in American society, which accepts it (to a certain
extent).83 One academically84 learns that discretion may imply the ignoring of minor offenses (expressly provided by the law). In a core
work of the American criminal system, I have expressly read that
“the lower the severity of the offense, the greater the freedom that the
police has to ignore it.”85 In addition, George Cole adds that even politeness can be a determining factor in discretion: “[. . .] a suspect that
demonstrates respect for the officer has a lower probability of being
arrested than he who in the opposite manner.”86 Or, as said by Benjamin Franklin: “Laws too gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe, sel-

82.
83.
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Id.
On the reasonableness of this measure (in fact, on the control of this measure), it is
worth referring to the article by Sanford Kadish, who mentions the principle of legality. He says that “In terms of fact, of course, the practice reduces this ideal to a myth,
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HARV. L. REV. 904 (1961).
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might decide not to make an arrest even in those situations in which a crime has just
been committed, when the accused and the evidence are “at hand.” This tends to portray the police as something other than an automated machine, as men whose judgment-discernment is essential in determining whether it is reasonable or not to invoke
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dom executed.”87 I would like to emphasize that this is not, therefore,
a “corrupt” act of the local authority. The explicit nature of such
practices is a consequence of the natural social acceptance of the acts.
Moreover, it is also true that this social acceptance strengthens the
character of transparency.
In the normative field, one also sees this transparency: the expression discretion appears seventy-seven times in the California Penal Code, which regulates a great diversity of subjects.88 In the same
line of reasoning, plea bargaining also represents the portrait of this
possibility of resolving the dispute without being tied to the rules of
legal application. I began this section with the phrase “This is the best
thing I can do for him.”89 It is with the same transparency and informality that “plea bargain” negotiations are held.
FIELD WORK IN BRAZILIAN CRIMINAL SYSTEM
(CRIMINAL NEGOTIATION)
As I have repeatedly noted, our aim is to understand the functioning of the bodies of the judiciary branch in both countries, starting from the premise that they are universes with substantial differentiation in their juridical cultures. Therefore, it is essential to conduct
the proper contextualization of each one of these situations. Only
with the contradictions, the dissents, and the consensus (appropriately
contextualized) will it be possible to perform a comparison of the differences because, when we talk about comparison, we are thinking
about the differences between the institutions of each system, which
uses the comparative method by contrasts. This sets apart the possibility of conducting a comparison by similarity, which would lead to
the erroneous conclusion that the institution of the most diverse legal
cultures are equal and differentiated only by subtle characteristics.

87.
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BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE QUOTABLE FOUNDING FATHERS: A TREASURY OF 2,500
WISE AND WITTY QUOTATIONS FROM THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO CREATED AMERICA
161 (2004).
See, CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West).
See supra Section II.a.
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a. The Necessary Contextualization of Brazilian Juridical
Culture and Criminal Negotiation
Contrary to the U.S. system, we find that the Brazilian legal culture arises from and follows a significantly different path. Prior to analyzing these topics in more depth, it is relevant to describe the remarkable characteristics associated with the mistaken legal theory
tradition about the topic in Brazil. First, the Brazilian juridical literature considers that the due process of law has an identity between the
two countries, which consequently forces us to arise from a mistaken
premise of the theme.90 Second, the juridical theory in Brazil asserts
that the negotiation brings the unequivocal and strong heritage of law
practiced in the U.S. regarding the institute of plea bargaining.91
We do not mean to make a value judgment of the objects that are
being compared. There will not be a value analysis toward which law
is better or worse. However, it is important to make it clear that the
two systems have characteristics that are substantially different as a
direct result of belonging to different juridical systems and according
to the culture of the States to which they belong. For this reason, in
an equivocal way, one of these systems is segmented into parts such
that these are incorporated into our or any other system with the purpose of supposedly ‘improving’ one of them. However, the effects of
this transplantation become unpredictable and results in little enlightening for the undertaken comparison.
b. The Field Working Space
Unlike in the U.S., Brazil’s legislation regarding the subject is
federal and, therefore, enjoys validity throughout the national territory. It is important to clarify this point, having in mind that my obser90.
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The theme discusses the interesting research in which the decontextualization sets
aside the attempt to make the comparison through similarities between the mentioned
institutions. MARCO AURÉLIO GONÇALVES, DEVIDO PROCESSO LEGAL: UM ESTUDO
COMPARADO (2004).
Although the author does not make a direct assertion, he does not fail in assuring that
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be the North American Law, whose model of Criminal Justice, based on the generalization of negotiated statements of guilt as a mode of rapid resolution of conflicts, has
been the source of inspiration for the legislative reform in many countries affected by
the collapse of its courts.” Soon after this affirmation, the author refers to plea bargaining. MÁRCIO FRANKLIN NOGUEIRA, TRANSAÇÃO PENAL 68 (Malheiros, 2003).
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vation on American courts only involved the judicial practices of the
State of California.
As discussed in the previous section, each state creates its own
legislation in criminal matters and thus leaves the responsibility of
disciplining a few crimes (and their respective procedures) of national repercussion to the federal sphere.92 In contrast, I remember that
the institution of plea-bargaining is used in a very similar way in the
more diverse areas of the country. In Brazil, the matter is governed in
a generic way by the Federal Constitution in Article 98(I), which discusses the creation of “special courts, filled by magisterial judges, or
magistrates and lay people, competent for the conciliation, trial, and
execution of civil causes of lower complexity and penal offenses of
minor offensive potential, by means of oral and abbreviated procedures, allowed, in the cases provided by law, the negotiation and the
trial of resources by groups of judges of first degree.”93
However, the Law 9.099/95 is the only regulation that institutes
conciliation and criminal negotiation.94 Therefore, this legislation is
applied throughout the national territory. The scope of my observation, however, was limited to Special Criminal Courts of the Metropolitan Region of Vitória-ES, where I observed conciliation and
criminal negotiation hearings and conducted some interviews with
the actors involved in this process.
c. Two Distinct and Poorly Understood Moments:
Conciliation and Criminal Negotiation
I must preliminarily highlight that the objective of this work is
not to perform a review of the legislation that regulates the Special
Criminal Courts; it is a matter of fieldwork in two judicial systems to
perform a comparison exercise. The intentions are to ascertain the
differences between negotiations in the criminal ambit made in Brazil

92.
93.
94.

See supra Section II.e.
CONSTITUÇAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 98(I) (Braz.).
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and in the U.S. and, mainly, to identify the disparities between what
the law says and what actually occurs in practice.
As outlined in the previous section, there is a legal-specific discipline regarding plea-bargaining. It is an explicitly informal practice
and a quality that the practitioners of law do not make any issue in
denying. The following are characteristics of this practice in the U.S.:
(1) There is no predefined time for its occurrence; (2) there is no specific location for the negotiation (except for its ratification); (3) the
judge does not necessarily participate in the negotiation (this will depend on each judge); (4) it can be applied, virtually, for all crimes;
(5) it generally requires an admission of guilt by the accused; and (6)
there is an incomparable discretion on the part of the District Attorney.95
In contrast, in Brazil, the matter is governed by law and contains
several details. Within the framework of this research, two points are
crucial: (1) To establish the main differences between both systems
and (2) to verify whether the judicial practices correspond to what is
regulated by the law. It is thus necessary to first acknowledge that
there are two distinct and sometimes poorly understood specific
points in time (during the process), especially in informal practices.
In Article 72, the statute 9.099/95, which addresses the mixing of
the civil and criminal fields, establishes the possibility of having a
negotiation regarding damages (civil sphere) in criminal proceedings.96 Until the advent of Special Criminal Courts, these two spheres
never communicated (except for the purposes of binding decisions, in
certain cases).97 At this point, there is an apparent difference to pleabargaining, through which we are not considering civil matters (at
least as a general rule).
It should therefore be clear that the term conciliation is limited to
the possible legal settlement (regarding civil damages). It is important
to stress this because Article 73 of the statute states that the judge or
the conciliator shall conduct the hearing.98 Throughout my field observations, I never observed a judge conducting a conciliation. More95.
96.
97.
98.

See supra Section II.
CONSTITUÇAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 72 (Braz.).
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over, at this point, a problem arises: Article 74 states that, in cases of
private criminal action or conditional to representation, the agreement
(in other words, the civil settlement) entails a waiver in the criminal
sphere.99
In other words, in judicial practice, the judge does not participate
in these cases. In one of my comments, I sought to determine the significance of the expression “under her guidance” in the view of the
judge. In response to my inquiry, she replied: “I never let a conciliation occur without my presence.”100 However, she made it explicitly
clear that her presence in practice means being in the same court because reconciliations occur in another room, without any supervision.
Still in the same court, when I insisted on the procedure, the
prosecutor said the following:
The conciliator is a lay judge and, therefore, an appendix
of the magistrate. He only does a hearing to attempt a conciliation, but all the resolutions taken at such hearings need
to subsequently pass through the sieve of the judge and the
Public Ministry. No conciliation passes outside of these offices [except, of course, in the hypothesis that the presence
of a member of the D.A. is not required].101
I realized, however, that the practice was very different. After
the conciliation hearing, the conciliator was limited to the minutes
signed by the judge.
When interviewing a conciliator, I heard the following statement: “I act as prosecutor.”102 In practice, as realized through my
field research, conciliation plays a significant role in the large and
vast majority of cases (in both private criminal action and conditional
to representation) and, therefore, could cause an extinction of punishment. In other words, contrary to what the law provides, the “solu-

99.

There are no “private criminal actions” in the U.S. All criminal matters have to be
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tion” given by the criminal sphere occurred without the presence of
the judge and the public prosecutor.
Let us see another facet of history. The purpose of this statute
was the resolution of criminal issues through legal civil settlements
(what we could call “civilization” of the criminal procedure).103 During the field observation, I noticed that, in almost all cases, there is no
actual civil agreement regarding damages. Instead, there is an interference of the conciliator that points out that the best solution is to
“forget everything.” Statistically, this is of great value to the courts.
Even the judge did not have knowledge of this process, but the result
will still be considered as a “solved lawsuit.”
During the course of this field observation, there were rare moments, which I observed the conciliator proposing a legal settlement
regarding civil damages. In these cases, the conciliator functioned as
a mediator by stating that the best result would be “a change in behavior” and always emphasized that it was a criminal court not a rendering to a “process of knowledge” with respect to any debts. In a
conversation with one of the conciliators, she made it clear that she
operates more as a psychologist than as an individual who dictates
statute 9.099/95. She added that, in the recent months, she had
reached a 100% success rate regarding the agreements. She then explained the reason for this success and said that, in fact, what the victim wants, at least, is to see the accused be obliged to attend the hearing “to suffer as he deserves,” as stated one of the victims.
In another hearing104 in which I participated, the woman who
was accompanying the threatened party said the following: “Does he
end up in jail?” and the conciliatory replied: “No, in Brazil, he does
not end up in jail.” She also mentioned the following: “This means
that if a person does not pay the other, [he] does not end up in jail.”
Every factor indicated that they were there for much more than a
debt. The companion of the threatened party thought that criminal
judgment would be competent to examine all of the issues involved
in the matter, including the non-payment of any severance payment.
For them, it was a single thing. They expected that the accused would
be arrested due to the debt owed as well as the threat made.
103. CONSTITUÇAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 74 (Braz.); 9.099/95 de CÓDIGO
PENAL (Brazilian Penal Code); Silva, supra note 94.
104. This was an indictment of threatening and personal injury.
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According to the conciliator, almost 100% of the people who
participate reach an agreement, which indicates that people are satisfied with simply the presence of the accused in the conciliation hearing and/or that the victim does not know what will happen if there is
no will to reach an agreement. Nevertheless, I repeat that the term
“waiver” is rarely used during hearings because the conciliator is limited to affirming that the best solution is to “forget everything such
that everyone may live in peace.”
I asked this same conciliator whether the solution could be
through a manifest waiver. She denied and said that what happens is
a real conciliation. In all the minutes she drafted, however, the waiver
was expressively provided in Article 107 of the Brazilian Penal
Code.105
We have addressed cases of conciliation for the civil settlement
which, in practice, leads to the extinction of the process. However, I
have realized that the judicial practices in criminal negotiations also
differ from what the law stipulates. Moreover, I recall that the participation of the conciliator, according to the law, is confined to the
stage of legal settlement regarding civil damages, not in the criminal
negotiation stage.
In the interlude of one of the conciliations, I asked one of conciliators if she also participated in the criminal negotiation. Her answer
was the following: “I participate. I do it. However, now I want to stop
doing it because I eventually do everything alone.”106
In other words, all of the hearings, whether conciliations or criminal negotiations, are conducted exclusively by the conciliator. Judges
and prosecutors only sign the minutes. In practice, according to my
observation, the judge participates only in cases in which the negotiation was frustrated (which is extremely rare) and if evidentiary and
judgment hearing are necessary.
d. The Problem of Consensus
Before the already demonstrated paradox, in which our criminal
proceedings are ruled by inquisitorial characteristics, it is noticeable
that part of the doctrine addresses the criminal negotiation as an insti105. CÓDIGO PENAL (Brazilian Penal Code) art. 107.
106. Interview with Conciliator, Special Criminal Court, Braz.
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tution derived from plea bargaining and that, above all, includes the
concept of consensus. Lets look at an example of the Brazilian doctrine:
Various European juridical systems, inspired by the US
system of plea bargaining, have adopted innovative solutions with the aim of reaching a quicker and more effective
Criminal Justice in answer to the concerns of the community. (...). The Brazilian legislator, with the publication of Law
9,099, introduced, for the first time in our criminal systematics, Special Criminal Courts with important innovations,
such as the conditional suspension of the proceedings and
the criminal negotiation, thereby fulfilling the precept of art.
98 I of the Federal Constitution of 1988, and eventually engaged in the formulation of a consensual Criminal Justice,
slackening that highly repressive characteristic in relation to
offenses of small and medium severity; thus, it put into
practice one of the most advanced programs of depenalization in the world (which must not be confused with decriminalization).107
Contrary to what it may seem, our model does not have characteristics of consensus. The whole process is conducted in such a
manner to converge the powers in the hands of the judge. Brazilian
law does not have the desire to achieve consensus on the facts by establishing, for example, which facts would be undisputed.108 What
occurs is a dissent that has no end, at least, in the context of the parties. The dissent is only dissipated when the figure of the judge arises
and, using his “free conviction,” opts for those facts or evidence that
lead to an unusual real truth (observed in the exposition of motives of
the Code of Criminal Procedure itself).
Even though it is impossible to completely deny the characteristics of consensus on a criminal negotiation, it cannot be stated that
the criminal negotiation is guided by a new consensual bias in Brazilian law. Within a hierarchical society, in which the contradictory is
the master line of the process, there is still no space for this consen107. MÁRCIO FRANKLIN NOGUEIRA, TRANSAÇÃO PENAL 22 (2003).
108. Id.
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sus. Unlike plea bargaining in the U.S., where there really is a consensus between the parties. As we know, the D.A. initiates legal proceedings against the defendant. However, D.A., in practice, is situated in the upper hierarchy. This is because, in Brazil, when one thinks
of the public, one thinks of the State, hence the hierarchization
Why? Because, strictly speaking, we have not, in this perspective, an accusatory system but an inquisitorial one. In the American
system, there is the figure of the State (judge) and the District Attorney, who is supposed to be the representative of the People. In Brazil,
both are figures of the State.109 Prosecutors are state tutors of the society with public individual interests, although official.110
In one of the hearings I attended, I heard the following statement
from a judge (addressing the accused): “Sometimes, it depends on the
Dr. X [prosecutor] or depends on me [judge]. I think that you Sir
have to accept it because otherwise it will be worse for you.” In addition, I have noticed through field research that the agreements are not
consensual because the parties do not know the real purpose of each
hearing. The conciliators—the real holders of “power”—want to “get
rid” of the process. Moreover, to achieve this, they take advantage of
a rule that is already known in Brazilian legal culture: that the process
is a problem that one should eliminate. Therefore, in the field observations, it remains clear that the negotiation is not a result of the consensus between the parties but, above all, is a result of the conduct by
the magistrate that aims primarily to end the process regardless of the
costs.
Thus, contrary to what occurs in the adversarial system where
the consensus is a remarkable factor, in the Brazilian case we find
that the negotiation enjoys a masked inquisitorial characteristic.111
It is distinguished, thus, from the forms of expression of opposing logics of the production of truth, which are dominant in academic
and scientific areas and founded in the quest for points of provisional
consensus on facts that are built through reflection and making the
different perspectives of those involved explicit in a process of
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. ROBERTO KANT DE LIMA, SENSIBILIDADES JURÍDICAS, SABER E PODER: BASES CULTURAIS
DE ALGUNS ASPECTOS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO EM UMA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA 29
(2009).
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demonstrative argumentation, which aims at convincing all legitimate
parties involved in the process: here, reaching a consensus between
pairs is essential to validate the knowledge.112
In the context of criminal negotiation, the judicial practices show
that the efficiency of the solution of processes prevails over any attempt to maintain the minimum guarantees of a process.113 In reality,
this is not a process, but rather a means through which the operators
will eliminate the problem.
There is a manipulation of information by means of an elite
communication between the law operators, through which the parties
are brought to an agreement more frequently through inquisitorial
reason than by consensus, particularly because one cannot consent to
something that one poorly comprehends.114 The fallacy of the consensus lies precisely in the fact that there is a false impression of a negotiated solution.115 As a result, there was an end to the process due to a
camouflaged imposition.
It is therefore the implementation of informal practices outside
the formal courtroom environment. One could say, however, that this
informality also occurs in plea bargaining. Nevertheless, the difference is precisely its transparency. That is the way the system works;
it is not camouflaged. There is not even a concern in regulating it. It
is important to note, however, that there is a significant difference between the public character of the process (such as the process that occurs in Brazil) and its transparency. It is necessary to understand how
the negotiation is publicized. The publication in the Official Gazette
(Diário Oficial) does not grant transparency to the legal practices.
The document is public, but there is no transparency. In one of the
hearings I attended, this logic was quite evident in the words of the
judge: “In your case, the agreement is the best solution because the
continuation of the process will be much worse for you—and I will
not give you a new opportunity.”

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSIONS
In the present work, we proposed to understand the law through
a compared empirical perspective (Brazil and the U.S.) and performed a thematic delimitation notably within the framework of the
forms of negotiation in criminal justice in both countries: plea bargaining and criminal negotiation. Because these systems are derived
from considerably distinct sources, we first sought to contextualize
them according to their traditions. Thus, we can draw several conclusions from the research.
(1) Despite all of the emphasis of the American universities in
transmitting the techniques and developing skills in relation to the jury trial, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved through plea
bargaining (97% of the cases brought to justice).116 Although academia itself admits this prevalence, the course of informal practices focuses more on jury trial than in the practices of plea bargaining. Indeed, there is a paradoxical perception of the self-conception that the
actors involved in the process have regarding their functions and
what would be more relevant in them. Everyone in general has the
power to negotiate, but only these actors have the prerogative to analyze the evidence and require the witnesses to appear in court, although under the statistical point of view, what they really do is plea
bargaining.
(2) In this context, the trial techniques are not so relevant. On the
contrary, there is a revelation of the connection between plea bargaining and the trial. It is as if all criminal judicial systems work around
the idea of consensus, which in turn is best represented by plea bargaining. This would be the main target.
(3) Trial attorneys are considered the best negotiators due to their
skill set and therefore often negotiate pleas. The other party foresees
that going to trial will be a difficult fight. Moreover, the difficulty is
not necessarily due to the other party having strong evidence, but the
knowledge that your opponent has technical skills (either from experience or not) that intimidate you.

116. Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judgesafter-rulings-on-plea-deals.html?_r=1.
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(4) Although it is customarily stated that the role of the judge in
plea bargaining is mitigated, I noticed that there was no judge who
gave up that control. I noticed a difference in the degree of relationship between the judge and the parties, and a certain level of interference in the agreements. Nevertheless, unlike what is observed in Brazilian law, I have never seen any magistrate who is a mere ratifier of
agreements.
(5) In the legal process in the U.S., the truth is built according to
the rules of consensus between the parties.117 What actually occurred
is much less important than what is agreed regarding the occurrence
of the facts. This collides with the Brazilian model in which the
search for real truth still permeates in the midst of legal theory.
(6) In Brazil, there is no intention to reach consensus or, in other
words, to establish the facts, including the evidence to be brought to
trial. The logic of this contradiction eventually results in the unsuccessful attempt to achieve consensus at the basis of the process: the
facts. The judge, gathering the contradictory ideas, will carry out his
judgment upon free conviction.
(7) The option for bargaining in U.S. law makes the declaration
of guilt indispensable.118 Moreover, the idea of confession, regret, and
forgiveness appear to always be linked to local religious rituals.119 It
would be difficult, indeed, to say that in a given society, the religious
values should be separated from the way in which this same society
addresses the regulation of the local law. In the case of the U.S., a nation with a very striking Protestant tradition,120 it is not difficult to
perceive the intermingling of these issues.

117. Consensus-Based Decision-Making Processes, CONSENSUS COUNCIL, INC. 3,
http://www.nd.gov/ndsd/docs/consensus-process.pdf.
118. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 20,
2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-pleadguilty/.
119. Paul Lauritzen, Forgiveness: Moral Prerogative or Religious Duty?, 15(2) J. RELIGION
ETHICS 141, 141 (1987). In general, according to my observation, many people agree
that many of these concepts mirror many of our religious values, but very many lawyers and judges would vehemently deny that U.S. legal system is linked to “religious
rituals” and would argue quite vociferously that they have separation of church and
state, unlike Brazil where it is possible to keep a large crucifix in the corner of the
courtroom.
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(8) Contrary to what occurs in the U.S. culture, in Brazil, the
maintenance of law is more the result of the concealment of the conflict.121 In American law, the negotiation, as observed by the institution of plea bargaining, is transparent (regarding the forms of guilt
and truth) and this is the characteristic that legitimizes the process.122
Hence, the need to make the comparison by confrontation and not by
similarity arises because mixing a system of consensus with a system
of dissent, whether it is accusatory (where charges are public) or inquisitorial (where charges are written and secretive) is the heart of the
problem.
(9) In Brazil, the state has the justice in its hands.123 The King is
the Emperor.124 These differences in the origin of the process demonstrate how these systems are anchored in different places. For this
reason, it is evident that the identification of plea bargaining is linked
to this feature of discretion, which does not occur in Brazil.
(10) Victory, game, opponent, and defeat are expressions that
denote not only a relationship—as could appear at first—with the solution of the disputes found in the trials, but also in the negotiation of
plea bargaining. The bargain is also performed in an arena behind the
scenes, which is typical of an adversarial system. However, all of these rules, unlike in Brazil, are transparent and are part of the system.
(11) In U.S. law, the bargain is not limited to the intention of reducing the penalty to be imposed. From the moment the accused de120. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations
on the Western Legal Tradition, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 479-80 (June 2008). In my fieldwork, I could also talk to Judge “M” who said, “I don’t think this simply reflects a
Protestant tradition. As a practicing Catholic, I am constantly reminded of sin, confession, regret, and forgiveness, but I agree that I sometimes feel like I must hear a statement of regret and admission of sin before I can ‘forgive.’ I think one difference is that
we Catholics confess in private. Some Protestants seem to be compelled to make public confessions, or at least statements of regret.”
121. Matthew S. Winters & Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Lacking Information or Condoning
Corruption? Voter Attitudes Toward Corruption in Brazil, COMP. POL. 418, 419-20
(2013).
122. Scott D. Hammond, The U.S. Model of Negotiated Plea Agreements: A Good Deal
with Benefits for All, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 17, 2006),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/us-model-negotiated-plea-agreements-good-dealbenefits-all.
123. Bruce Douglas, The Story of Brazil’s Killer Cops, GQ MAGAZINE (July 13, 2015),
http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/brazil-killer-cops.
124. The Nature of Government, AM. GOV’T (2014), http://www.ushistory.org/gov/1b.asp.
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clares himself guilty, the negotiating parties establish their highest
degree of discretion. When the prosecutor, the lawyer, and the judge
start the negotiation, assuming there is a possibility of a declaration
of guilt, a large opening regarding the “destination” of the accused
and the legal classification of the committed crime can be “chosen.”
Therefore, the prosecution will be formulated by a symbolic fact,
which is “created” by means of a negotiation. On the negotiating table, the penal code does not serve as a parameter for the suitability of
the practiced conduct, but as a range of options that serves as the
helm for the choice (pick up) of the punishment to be applied.
(12) The term “plead guilty,” for citizens in general, is not purely
a technical legal term. It is expressly and commonly pronounced by
them. Unlike in Brazil, where information of certain procedures of
the criminal proceedings is reserved for the experts, all of the classes
in the U.S. are familiar with and fully aware of pleading guilty.
(13) In terms of development, the identification of the differences in the concept of citizenship in Brazil and in the United States
is vital to understand the current Brazilian juridical landscape and,
particularly, the criminal institutes involved. Socio-economic differences are typical of a capitalist model, but they do not prevent (on the
contrary) legal equality, which is a real current attribute for the justification of privileges.
(14) Unlike plea bargaining, in which there is a consensus between the parties, in Brazil, this consensus is introduced by the D.A.,
who in practice is situated in the upper hierarchy. Agreements are not
consensual because the parties, specially the defendant, do not know
the real purpose of each of the hearings. The conciliators, the real
holders of “power,” want to get rid of the process. Moreover, to
achieve this, they take advantage of a concept that is already known
in Brazilian legal culture: the process is a problem that one should
eliminate. Thus, contrary to what occurs in the adversarial system,
where the consensus is a remarkable factor, we found that in the Brazilian case, the negotiation enjoys a masked inquisitorial characteristic. Moreover, this transparency gives legitimacy to the process.
(15) The attempt to import models derived from different legal
systems creates what is called “cognitive dissonance.”125 Both the
125. MARIA STELLA DE AMORIM ET AL., JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CRIMINAIS SISTEMA JUDICIAL E
SOCIEDADE NO BRASIL 41-72 (2003).
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comparison of the similarities between criminal negotiation and plea
bargaining and the importation of the latter to Brazilian law (as intended by the proposal to reform the CP) collide in the problem of the
paradox. In the U.S., the due process of law aims at individual guarantees, whereas in Brazil, the due process of law has been safeguarding the interests of the process itself, which makes it more of a state
guarantee than a right of individual freedom.
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